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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cyberattacks now regularly make global headlines. While the 
implications of electronic threats to IT systems, finance, healthcare, 
and government administration are well-known, there are also very 
significant and growing—though less well-known—implications for 
manufacturers. The recent “WannaCry” virus that disabled much of 
the United Kingdom’s National Health Service also forced a Honda 
plant in Japan to halt production. In June 2017, more than half of the 
organizations targeted by the Petya (also known as Expetr) cyberattack 
were industrial companies.
The scale and variety of cyber-threats to 
manufacturers have grown considerably in 
recent years, and now range from rare and 
sophisticated Stuxnet-style attacks to relatively 
frequent ransomware risks. In addition to 
malware attacks on industrial firms, cyberattacks 
on manufacturers can include efforts to corrupt 
data, steal intellectual property (IP), sabotage 
equipment, and disable networks. The purposes 
and effects of attacks vary widely, but all such 
incidents cost time and money to industrial firms 
and their customers. 
As manufacturing becomes increasingly digitized 
and data-driven, manufacturers will find themselves 
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at serious risk. Although there has yet to be a major 
successful cyberattack on a U.S. manufacturing 
operation, threats continue to rise. The complexities 
of multi-organizational dependencies and data-
management in modern supply chains mean that 
vulnerabilities are multiplying.
There is widespread agreement among 
manufacturers, government agencies, 
cybersecurity firms, and leading academic 
computer science departments that U.S. industrial 
firms are doing too little to address these looming 
challenges. Unfortunately, manufacturers in 
general do not see themselves to be at particular 
risk. This lack of recognition of the threat may 
represent the greatest risk of cybersecurity 
failure for manufacturers. Public and private 
stakeholders must act before a significant attack 
on U.S. manufacturers provides a wake-up call. 
Cybersecurity for the manufacturing supply chain 
is a particularly serious need. Manufacturing 
supply chains are connected, integrated, and 
interdependent; security of the entire supply 
chain depends on security at the local factory 
level. Increasing digitization in manufacturing—
especially with the rise of Digital Manufacturing, 
Smart Manufacturing, the Smart Factory, and 
Industry 4.0, combined with broader market 
trends such as the Internet of Things (IoT)—
exponentially increases connectedness. At the 
same time, the diversity of manufacturers—from 
large, sophisticated corporations to small job 
shops—creates weakest-link vulnerabilities that 
can be addressed most effectively by public-
private partnerships. 
These vulnerabilities are particularly concerning 
in the large, complex supply chains for weapons 
systems and other manufacturing procurement 
by the Department of Defense (DoD). The 
consequences of a cyberattack on defense 
production could be profound, possibly limiting 
production volumes and schedules, as well as 
having the potential for catastrophic failure of 
weapons systems and equipment.
Experts consulted in the development of this 
report called for more holistic thinking in industrial 
cybersecurity: improvements to technologies, 
management practices, workforce training, 
and learning processes that span units and 
supply chains. Solving the emerging security 
challenges will require commitment to continuous 
improvement, as well as investments in research 
and development (R&D) and threat-awareness 
initiatives. This holistic thinking should be applied 
across interoperating units and supply chains. 
Much like quality systems, cybersecurity 
improvements should ideally be market-driven, 
and based on quantified insurance risk or 
competitive financial advantage. Still, more 
extensive government regulation may be needed, 
mirroring industrial safety and health. Regardless 
of the form that these changes take, it is clear that 
new risk management and opportunity models are 
needed to address the rise of hyper-connected, 
multi-vendor hardware and software platforms. 
Stakeholders across sectors must work together 
to build a culture of vigilance and to apply essential 
security practices across supply chains. 
Cooperation is key. There is a critical need for 
industry-government-academia cooperation 
to build the collaborative components of a 
supply chain/ecosystem security framework. 
Multiple government programs are now engaged 
in this work, including the DoD, Department of 
Energy (DoE), Department of Commerce (DoC), 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST). The Manufacturing USA institutes and 
Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership 
(MEP) program have important roles in testing, 
training, and technology implementation. 
Academic programs, such as those at Texas A&M 
University and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
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and State University, as well as key vendors in 
cybersecurity research and training, must be 
involved in development, dissemination, and 
implementation of effective cybersecurity solutions. 
A great deal of existing capability can be focused 
on manufacturing, but R&D to create effective 
technologies and new capabilities is needed to 
achieve a truly cyber-secure manufacturing sector. 
A holistic approach to cybersecurity requires 
support from diverse players across sectors.
SUMMARY OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Within the overall context of the cybersecurity 
challenges facing manufacturers, workshop 
participants and contributors recommend the 
following areas of action to achieve both near and 
long-term benefits: 
1. Create a public-private partnership focused
on manufacturing supply chain cybersecurity.
Specific tasks for such a partnership include:
a. Develop a national strategy for
strengthening manufacturing
cybersecurity that would identify and
coordinate existing public and private
efforts as well as additional resources
sufficient to address the diverse testing,
training, and R&D needed to meet the
challenges in manufacturing cybersecurity.
b. Accelerate the application of existing
cybersecurity technologies and practices
to manufacturing to immediately lower the
risks of cyberattacks.
c. Coordinate facilities and mechanisms
to address R&D challenges identified in
Recommendation 2.
d. Support manufacturing sector specific
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs)/Information Sharing and Analysis
Organizations (ISAOs) (Recommendation 3).
e. Coordinate cyber ranges and test beds to
i. ensure comprehensive testing for
vulnerabilities and effective patching
in components, equipment, software,
and other aspects of networked cyber
physical systems (CPS) of systems,
ii. act as sandboxes to test new ideas
safely and securely,
iii. provide “cyber autopsy” capabilities, and
iv. promote the creation of standard
models for Operations Technology
(OT)  systems.
f. Coordinate the development of curricula
and creation of boot camps for effective
training of the general manufacturing
workforce in cybersecurity best practices,
as well as OT and Information Technology
(IT) technical professionals in evolving
threats, emerging technological solutions,
effective OT/IT interface, and CPS of
systems engineering.
2. Establish a federal research initiative
to address both near- and long-term
cybersecurity challenges and opportunities.
Fundamental research should address
systems of systems engineering
methodologies for cyber physical systems
with designed-in cybersecurity and resilience,
treating linked cyber spaces as systems
design/interface risk problems. Critical
development activities that should commence
now and require support to evolve include:
a. Create systems and security reference
architectures for manufacturing
that define the OT and IT functions,
standards, and integration requirements.
The reference architectures should be
applicable across a diverse range of
manufacturing devices, operations, and
enterprises, and different vendor control,
modeling, and automation platforms.
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b. Establish software and hardware
trust anchor frameworks for securely
connecting and managing many devices,
systems, and data in manufacturing
systems without central management.
c. Develop systems-of-systems architecture
design and analysis that include integration
with cloud services.
Critical R&D objectives that would benefit from 
immediate focused attention include creation of:
a. Automated vulnerability assessment
and detection tools. Many tools currently
exist but are not tuned for manufacturing
or the operational requirements of a
production setting.
b. Analytics-based detection—networks or
machines—and use of digital twins.
c. Tools to audit the extent of attacks.
d. Automated, robust part validation
technology, including automated ledger
technologies such as blockchain, for
trusted parts and data validation.
3. Establish manufacturing industry-specific
ISACs/ISAOs or similar organizations to
facilitate fault-free, anonymous sharing
of incidents, threats, vulnerabilities, best
practices, and solutions. Existing ISACs/
ISAOs provide models. Proactive collaborative
activities that manufacturing-specific ISACs/
ISAOs could initiate include:
a. Develop a data repository of anonymous
submissions of cyberattacks, and
disseminate anonymized reports to
manufacturers on a regular schedule.
b. Coordinate use of decoys for intelligence
gathering and sharing.
c. Create industry test beds, cyber ranges, and
demonstration facilities to safely prototype
and test OT and IT security technologies,
identify system-level vulnerabilities, and
provide a “cyber autopsy” capability.
d. Identify and disseminate best practices
and provide training platforms/curricula.
4. Establish an executive-level working group to
provide a strong industry voice to advocate
for and motivate industry action to strengthen
cybersecurity. Using the emergence of quality
system certifications as a model, the working
group should drive market-based incentives
for stronger cybersecurity in manufacturing.
The goal should be for most manufacturers
to implement the practices identified in the
Repeatable and Adaptive Implementation Tiers
in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and to
meet the requirements in relevant standards
such as ISA/IEC 62443 and ISO 27001.
Certification to those standards should become
a requirement for purchasing decisions, similar
to ISO 9001. The working group should also:
a. Promote participation by all manufacturers
in their industry’s ISAC/ISAO.
b. Facilitate the emergence of financial risk
management procedures that can apply to
cybersecurity practices.
c. Communicate with executives in other
at-risk economic sectors such as finance
and energy to ensure that solutions
developed for those industries are applied
in manufacturing.
5. Similar to existing frameworks on cybersecurity
and cyber physical security, a comprehensive
framework should be developed specifically for
manufacturing supply chain cybersecurity. It
should reference:
a. robust part validation technologies,
b. methods to audit attacks and responses,
c. a common language across
multiple functional departments and
organizations, and
d. application of appropriate standards such
as ISA/IEC 62443 and ISO 27001.
4 CYBERSECURITY FOR MANUFACTURERS
SECURING THE DIGITIZED AND CONNECTED FACTORY 5
ABOUT THIS REPORT
On March 14-15, 2017, MForesight, in cooperation 
with the Computing Community Consortium, 
convened a workshop of manufacturing and 
cybersecurity experts to address the unique 
and complex cybersecurity issues facing 
manufacturing as the digitization of the industry 
grows. The goals of the workshop were to: 
1. Consider useful steps to accelerate 
adoption of cybersecurity practices across 
manufacturing supply chains that depend 
on interdependency and interoperability of 
individual company practices; 
2. Identify priority activities to raise awareness 
and implementation of cybersecurity 
technology and management practices to 
achieve inherently secure, repeatable, and 
adaptable manufacturing activities; and
3. Align next-generation cybersecurity research 
with the needs of manufacturers.
The workshop outcomes were enhanced by 
subsequent discussions with other experts 
in specific cybersecurity areas. This report 
summarizes the consensus of these manufacturing, 
government, academic, and coalition experts 
focused on cybersecurity in manufacturing. (See 
Appendix 3 for a list of contributors and Appendix 4 
for the workshop agenda.)
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THREATS TO 
CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Cyberattacks pose a growing threat not only to national security but also 
to U.S. economic competitiveness. Manufacturing firms, in particular, are 
vulnerable to threats including sabotage of operations, alteration of data 
and product designs, and theft of intellectual property.
Cybersecurity for manufacturing requires serious 
attention. The sector presents special security 
challenges because of the unique nature of 
cyber physical systems (CPS), which includes 
operations technology (OT) such as industrial 
control systems (ICS), supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems, and networked 
machines, sensors, data, and software.1 Changes 
to these systems can result in physical changes 
in materials, parts, and environments. Effective 
response to cyberattacks on manufacturing 
firms requires a critical assessment of gaps in 
the technology, broad adoption of existing best 
practices, and research to develop inherently safe 
systems and rapid response tools. Cybersecurity 
measures must be enhanced to protect a 
1 Appendix 2 provides a glossary of terms commonly used in manufacturing technology and cybersecurity.
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highly integrated and interoperable network of 
manufacturers and service providers. 
To date, the private sector has not adequately 
addressed the unique cyber threats facing 
manufacturing firms. Existing cybersecurity 
products and solutions designed to secure 
information technology (IT) systems do 
not address the cyber threats that target 
an interconnected system of suppliers and 
customers. For example, insecure networks 
at lower tier suppliers offer entry points for 
malicious software, which can then infect 
the entire supply chain. Unfortunately, small 
and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) 
often do not have the resources to hire 
dedicated security staff to establish security 
procedures, adopt standards, and monitor 
network integrity. Standards relevant to ICS 
security, such as ISA/IEC 62443 and ISO 
27001 (see Appendix 1), provide a starting 
point, but in the rapidly changing cyber threat 
environment, their implementation and adoption 
by manufacturing firms (especially SMMs) has 
been slow and difficult.2 Government agencies 
that support research efforts in cyber physical 
security offer a range of resources to assist 
companies in assessing their vulnerabilities,3,4 
but the focus is largely on ICS, and it is often 
challenging for smaller manufacturers to 
implement the recommended protection 
protocols. The academic community has been 
engaged in developing cybersecurity tools 
for manufacturing,5,6 but the breadth of risks 
and implementation challenges leave many 
manufacturers vulnerable.
The unauthorized access and control of digitally 
controlled systems is of particular concern 
in the manufacturing community. In contrast 
to conventional IT systems, cybersecurity of 
manufacturing poses a unique challenge to 
CPS. Every manufacturing job introduces new 
executable code into these systems, making 
the data flowing through the system vulnerable 
to theft and/or alteration. According to the 2015 
White House Supply Chain Innovation Initiative 
(2015), standards related to cybersecurity are 
particularly challenging, as original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) are increasingly demanding 
minimal digital safeguards to maximize 
interoperability throughout their supply chains. 
As software-based control and monitoring of 
manufacturing machines increases, the risk of 
malicious cyberattacks also grows.
CYBER THREATS TO 
U.S. MANUFACTURING
Manufacturers, particularly those in critical 
manufacturing industries, have long been 
recognized as potential targets of cyberattacks. 
Attacker motivations span a broad range 
including theft of intellectual property (IP) 
and trade secrets, sabotage of processes and 
output, extortion, and malicious damage to 
networks and information systems. Recent 
patterns of cyberattacks confirm that, although 
financial services, public administration, and 
utilities are the most targeted economic sectors, 
manufacturing is a significant target. Within 
manufacturing, the automotive, chemicals, and 
computers and electronics industries are targeted 
most frequently (see Figure 1).
2 NDIA White Paper: Cybersecurity for Manufacturing, May 2014.
3 https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Reports/ FY2015_Industrial_Control_Systems_ Assessment_Summary_Report_S508C.pdf.
4 https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Assessments.
5 https://cybersecurity.tamu.edu/about-us/. 
6 https://sites.google.com/a/vt.edu/cyber-physicalsecuritysystemsmfg/. 
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FIGURE 1. TOP TARGETED MANUFACTURING SUB-INDUSTRIES.
SOURCE: IBM MANAGED SECURITY SERVICES.
Cybersecurity firms such as Kaspersky, McAfee, 
Trend Micro, and Symantec track the sources and 
types of threats, their objectives, and their targets 
as they change over time. In general, the number 
of reported so-called zero-day vulnerabilities, that 
is, a vulnerability in software that is unknown to 
the vendor, declined by approximately 20 percent 
from 2014 to 2016.7 For systems important to 
manufacturers, the number of vulnerabilities 
discovered in ICS fell in 2016 to 165, down from 
200 in 2015 (see Figure 2).8 New vulnerabilities 
were discovered in 2016 in 16 different SCADA 
applications from 15 different vendors.9
As these vulnerabilities are closed, attackers 
have shifted strategies to use malware attached 
7 Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report, April 2017, p. 14.
8 Symantec, p. 17.
9 Trend Micro, TrendLabs 2016 Security Roundup: A Record Year for Enterprise Threats, 2017, p. 31 at https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/
security/research-and-analysis/threat-reports/roundup.
10 Ibid., p. 26.
to email and hidden in legitimate administrative 
tools to gain access to targeted systems. Specific 
to the manufacturing industry, 1 in 130 emails 
contained malware, roughly equal to the average 
across all industries, but the number of phishing 
emails targeting manufacturers was 1 in 3,171, 
significantly higher than the average.10 One type 
of email attack becoming more popular because 
of its profitability is called a Business Email 
Compromise (BEC). In a BEC scam, a spoofed 
email appearing to come from the company’s 
senior management is sent to a company’s 
financial staff with instructions to transfer funds 
to the attacker’s account. In other cases, the BEC 
email contains a false or altered invoice. According 
to Symantec, more than 400 businesses were 
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11 Ibid.
12 E. Nakashima and S. Mufson, “U.S., China Vow Not to Engage in Economic Cyber Espionage,” The Washington Post, September 25, 2015, 
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/us-china-vow-not-to-engage-in-economic-cyberespionage/2015/09/25/90e74b6a-63b9- 
11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html?utm_term=.4a1b98dbfaab.
13 Symantec, p. 20.
14 Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,” at https://www.csis.org/programs/technology- 
policy-program/cybersecurity/other-projects-cybersecurity/ significant-cyber.
FIGURE 2. VULNERABILITIES DISCLOSED IN INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS.
SOURCE: SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT, APRIL 2017.
targeted every day in 2016, resulting in more than 
$3 billion in losses. In 2016, an Austrian aerospace 
company lost nearly $50 million in a BEC scam.11
Manufacturers also have been the targets of 
cyber-espionage attacks. Symantec’s research 
indicates that a majority of cyber-espionage 
attacks from 2011 to 2013 sought access to IP 
and trade secrets of manufacturers. More than 
half of successful IP thefts involved state-affiliated 
actors, and 57 percent of these attacks originated in 
China. However, in 2015, China and the United States 
reached an agreement in which neither government 
would conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of IP.12 
Since then, detections of malware linked to Chinese 
cyber-espionage groups have fallen significantly, 
although the threat has not been eliminated.13 For 
instance, in July 2016 a Chinese cyber-espionage 
group targeted defense industries in Russia, Belarus, 
and Mongolia. In the same month, a new strain of 
cyber-espionage malware targeting European energy 
companies was discovered.14  
Another type of attack targeting manufacturers 
seeks to alter automated production processes with 
the intent of destroying the production equipment 
or compromising it enough that output is unusable. 
Sometimes known as cyber-sabotage, this type 
of cyberattack is most famously illustrated by the 
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Stuxnet computer worm targeting ICS in Iran’s 
nuclear facility in 2010. Since then, variants of 
Stuxnet have been found in the wild, notably the 
Duqu Trojan found in Europe, that was designed to 
gather information about ICS,15 and another variant 
discovered in 2010 that exploited a Microsoft 
Windows vulnerability to attack SCADA systems.16 
This worm caused the destruction of a water pump 
at a public utility in Springfield, Illinois, in 2011.17 In 
2014, malware known as Havex and BlackEnergy 
took advantage of a flaw in Windows to control 
SCADA systems.18 More recently, in 2016, security 
researchers discovered another Stuxnet variant, 
called Irongate, designed to target ICS and SCADA 
systems.19 Another sophisticated malware that 
is not a Stuxnet variant was uncovered in June 
2017. Known as Crash Override or Industroyer, it 
was likely used in a cyberattack against the power 
grid in Ukraine in December 2016. With small 
modifications, it could be used against electric 
utilities and industrial targets in the United States.20 
According to one report, attacks on SCADA systems 
increased by 636 percent from 2012 to 2014.21 The 
trend continued in 2016 with attacks targeting ICS 
more than doubling the number in 2015.22 
Because of the large number, variety, and 
complexity of manufacturing control systems, 
and the high dollar value of lost production, 
manufacturers, especially SMMs, are ripe for 
ransomware attacks. The number of ransomware 
families more than tripled, the number of infections 
increased 36 percent, and the average ransom 
amount nearly tripled in the past year, with email 
serving as the primary attack channel.23 Among 
the 247 new ransomware families added in 2016, 
70 targeted computer-aided design (CAD) files 
widely used in manufacturing.24
Anecdotal evidence suggests that state-sponsored 
attacks have tended to target infrastructure 
grids such as power and water and large critical 
manufacturing operations. In contrast, attacks 
on general manufacturers have tended to 
originate from a diverse set of hackers. Reported 
attacks have not been sufficient in number or 
prominence to motivate much action among 
manufacturers, even though U.S. manufacturers 
are the target of nearly half the known 
cyberattacks on manufacturing (see Figure 3). 
A cyberattack also can come from a host of 
non-technical sources. A recent study by Deloitte 
and MAPI25 found that errors by employees 
(or deliberate acts) pose a significant concern 
to companies, especially those firms that are 
not actively protecting their IP and do not have 
procedures to protect against insider threats. Many 
firms falsely think that separating their internal 
networks and control systems from the external 
internet (air-gapping) is the most cost-effective 
cybersecurity strategy, but this approach puts 
15 ”Stuxnet Variant Discovered in European Systems,” Power, Oct. 19, 2011, at http://www.powermag.com/stuxnet-variant-discovered-in-
european-systems/.
16  J. Kirk, “Second variant of Stuxnet worm strikes,” InfoWorld, July 20, 2010, at http://www.infoworld.com/ article/2625596/endpoint- 
protection/second-variant-of-stuxnet-worm-strikes.html.
17 M. Long, “Stuxnet Strike on U.S. Utility Signals Disturbing Trend,” Yahoo News, Nov. 21, 2011, at https://www.yahoo.com/news/stuxnet- 
strike-u-utility-signals-disturbing-trend-224036723.html.
18 IBM Managed Security Services, Security Attacks on Industrial Control Systems: How Technology Advances Create Risks for Industrial  
Organizations, Oct. 2015, p. 5, at https://www.ibm.com/marketing/iwm/dre/signup?source=mrs-form-4573&S_PKG=ov39538.
19 M. Kumar, “Irongate—New Stuxnet-like Malware Targets Industrial Control Systems,” The Hacker News, June 4, 2016, at http://  
thehackernews.com/2016/06/irongate-stuxnet-malware.html.
20 J. Finkle, “Security firms warn of new cyber threat to electric grid,” Reuters, June 12, 2017, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber- 
attack-utilities-idUSKBN1931EG.
21 IBM Managed Security Systems, p. 5.
22 D. McMillen, “Attacks Targeting Industrial Control Systems Up 110 Percent,” Security Intelligence, at https://securityintelligence.com/ 
attacks-targeting-industrial-control-systems-ics-up-110-percent.
23 Symantec, p. 11.
24 Trend Micro, p. 5.
25 https://www.mapi.net/forecasts-data/cyber-risk-advanced-manufacturing.
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the company at a disadvantage in an increasingly 
connected world, and is completely ineffective at 
preventing insider attacks.
The growing digitization of manufacturing production 
and increasingly complex IT networks within and 
between factories introduces a growing number 
of potential vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, the profile 
of cybersecurity threats is constantly changing as 
vulnerabilities in software and firmware systems are 
closed, telltale signatures of malware are recognized, 
and law enforcement focuses on hacker groups.
Vendors of ICS, SCADA systems, and other cyber 
system OT and IT components, (e.g., sensors, 
data connectors, structure and management 
systems, platforms, analytics and modeling 
FIGURE 3. WHERE ATTACKED MANUFACTURERS WERE LOCATED IN 2015.
SOURCE: IBM MANAGED SECURITY SERVICES
packages, visualization and virtual reality tools) are 
including cybersecurity features in their product 
offerings. For example, Rockwell Automation offers 
products to control access to industrial equipment, 
detect tampering, and secure factory networks.26 
Global manufacturers GE and Siemens have 
introduced new operating platforms that promise 
stronger cybersecurity. GE’s cloud-based Predix 
platform includes data analytics, connectivity, and 
cybersecurity features.27 Siemens has introduced 
a similar platform called MindSphere. Both 
companies offer internally developed apps and 
hope to build large communities of independent app 
developers. Both also offer digital twins: GE has a 
growing library of virtual digital profiles of more than 
500,000 industrial machines; Siemens provides 
26 Rockwell Automation, “Industrial Security: Protecting Networks and Facilities Against a Fast-changing Threat Landscape,” July 2016, at 
http://literature.rockwellautomation.com/idc/groups/literature/ documents/wp/secur-wp004_-en-e.pdf?event-category=eBook&event- 
action=Download&event-label=Security_Global_XX_EN_2016_Industrial_Security_Whitepaper.
27 N. Schwiters and B. Moritz, “10 Principles for Leading the Next Industrial Revolution,” Strategy + Business, March 23, 2017, at https://www.
strategy-business.com/article/10-Principles-for-Leading-the-Next-Industrial-Revolution?gko=f73d3.
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digital twins to duplicate and simulate products, 
production lines, processes, and entire factories.28
Even as vendors recognize the importance of 
cybersecurity in their new product offerings, 
manufacturers operate with a large base and 
immense variety of old but still serviceable 
equipment (so-called legacy systems). The average 
age of information processing equipment used 
in manufacturing is 5 years, while conversely, 
the average age of industrial equipment in 2016 
was 10 years, the highest since 1940.29 This broad 
lifecycle diversity poses an enormous challenge: 
how can risks to legacy systems be assessed 
appropriately and addressed effectively? 
The cybersecurity threats facing U.S. 
manufacturers are already severe. Digitized, 
28 Siemens, “Industrie 4.0: Siemens Demonstrates Digital Twin in Actual Operation,” April 24, 2017, at https://www.siemens.com/press/ 
PR2017040272DFEN.
29 T. Aeppel, “Old Machines Show Why Trump Tax Breaks May Not Spark New Company Spending,” Reuters, May 19, 2017, at http://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-usa-manufacturing-investment-analysis-idUSKCN18E1DI.
networked, and global supply chains create an 
extremely complex environment that is difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to secure completely. The risk 
to large supply chains in defense procurement is 
especially concerning given the need to maximize 
quality and integrity of weapons systems, in 
which failure of a small fastener in an aircraft, 
for example, can result in catastrophe. Strong 
initiatives are needed now in R&D, data sharing and 
analysis, testing, training, and implementation of 
solutions. No single company or single security 
product can accomplish the steps necessary 
to strengthen cybersecurity in manufacturing. 
Mechanisms for intra- and inter-industry 
collaboration will be needed. Threats change 
constantly. Effective action is overdue.
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CHAPTER 2
CREATE A PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP FOCUSED 
ON MANUFACTURING 
CYBERSECURITY
MANUFACTURING 
CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES 
ARE UNIQUE
The very nature of manufacturing creates 
cybersecurity challenges that other industries 
do not face, or not with the same risk. More 
than most industries, modern manufacturing 
depends on the flow of materials, parts, 
assemblies, energy, data, and people from 
many different sources. Cyber physical security 
must address multiple factories in the supply 
chain, along with the movement of inputs and 
outputs that introduce risk, uncertainty, and control 
challenges. Qualification of all suppliers in the 
chain is necessary in product specifications, chain 
of custody, process conditions, and data integrity 
and security. Securing this complex interaction 
of potentially vulnerable systems affects all 
industries, but is especially important in defense 
production where national security depends on 
high-quality, reliable weapons systems. 
Manufacturing interoperates with key 
infrastructures that include energy grids, water 
resources, gas and fuel networks, and a myriad 
of transportation and distribution systems. All of 
these infrastructure systems have cybersecurity 
issues that can affect manufacturing. In this 
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context, infrastructure and service providers 
such as utilities, gas and fuel systems, and 
waste treatment facilities are all part of the 
manufacturing supply chain.
The sequential nature of manufacturing 
operations exacerbates the challenges. The 
performance of the next operation depends on 
high-quality output from the previous operation 
and may amplify minor changes that can lead to 
catastrophic effects. For example, minor changes 
to part definition data can be virtually undetectable 
yet lead to part failure that can ruin a final 
assembly or worse, resulting in operational failure.
Factories are always operating, complicating 
OT and IT maintenance. Checking software 
versions, installing patches, and performing 
vulnerability testing are difficult or not possible 
during operation. A typical factory’s aggregate CPS 
of systems is sufficiently complex (and expensive) 
that having a separate system to test updates 
before applying them to the production system is 
usually not possible. Furthermore, testing during 
scheduled maintenance downtimes may be 
impractical and can introduce uncertainty during 
the restart.
Factory operations are constantly changed and 
optimized to ensure that product specifications 
and operational economics, impacts, and 
safety goals are all met. CPS security must be 
accomplished in the face of constantly changing 
conditions that are often stochastic in nature. 
Furthermore, statistical sampling used to verify 
manufacturing results are built on top of the 
stochastic properties of physical manufacturing. 
Cyberattacks can take advantage of statistical 
process control (SPC) methods and systems to 
make detection of quality problems more difficult.
In most factories, the aggregate CPS of systems 
is a complex mix of equipment and networks 
from multiple vendors with multiple operating 
systems, controllers, and interconnections. New 
equipment works alongside legacy equipment 
that can be decades old. Equipment from different 
vendors is typically compartmentalized, requiring 
third-party software to interconnect proprietary 
systems. Further, these interconnections are 
often made in an ad hoc, peer-to-peer manner 
resulting in a diverse set of non-standard 
interconnections. Some experts argue that 
this diversity creates additional challenges for 
potential hackers that mitigate cyberattack risk. 
The prevailing consensus, however, is that ad 
hoc interconnections increase cyberattack risk 
because they are difficult and costly to maintain 
for security and operations.
Inherent in the context of systems of OT and IT 
systems and adding to the complexity, factories 
use complex heterogeneous data and modeling 
systems spanning a wide spectrum of time 
constants. Sensor input from and control signals 
to many different physical assets on very short 
time frequencies (e.g., millisecond control signals 
to multiple valves from a Distributed Control 
System) are common. The latency of the input 
and/or control signal cannot exceed the control 
system design parameters, which puts constraints 
on security measures: cybersecurity measures 
cannot introduce time lags between sensing 
and actuation without compromising equipment 
performance and even operational safety. More 
generally, the impact of CPS on the physical 
world and its increasing interconnectedness raise 
concerns about trustworthiness. Manufacturers at 
all levels in networked supply chains need to trust 
that their data, equipment, and systems are safe, 
reliable, private, and secure. 
Cyber physical system security is not just 
about protecting operations. IP is embodied in 
product design and associated process design 
and specifications. The parameters and process 
specifications that ensure cost-effective 
production are often highly valued trade secrets 
that must be protected from hackers.
Finally, to further complicate these inherent 
challenges, the prevailing organizational 
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structure in manufacturing separates IT and 
OT. Responsibility for security tends to be within 
the IT department, tends to focus only on IT, and 
stops at network security. CPS risk assessments, 
if done at all, are performed by manufacturing OT 
groups.30 Operations rarely consider cybersecurity 
threats. A rapid increase in recent years in malware 
targeting industrial control systems, often brute-
force attacks on SCADA systems, emphasizes the 
increasing risks of complacency.
TESTING FOR VULNERABILITIES 
AND EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS
One of the greatest challenges to manufacturing 
cybersecurity is the difficulty of safely 
testing manufacturing systems. Many security 
issues arise at the interfaces of interoperable 
components, often sourced from different 
manufacturers. Whereas the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration and the National 
Security Test Site have end-to-end facilities for 
testing the crashworthiness of vehicles and the 
survivability of systems, respectively, there is no 
analogue for cybersecurity in manufacturing. Large 
OEMs have the means to create entire test factory 
floors, but even such facilities face challenges to 
achieving reasonable cybersecurity assurance 
of the interoperable components in a realistic 
environment. The ideal solution is a network of 
test bed and cyber range facilities that share 
information and findings specifically designed for 
manufacturing cybersecurity needs. 
The federal government can play a vital role in 
supporting and coordinating testing infrastructures 
that span multiple stakeholders. For example, Sandia 
National Laboratory operates the National SCADA 
Test Bed. Its focus is on energy system reliability, 
but it has significant overlap with SCADA systems 
used in manufacturing.31 The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) has created a 
small test bed for ICS cybersecurity.32 The Digital 
Manufacturing Design and Innovation Institute (DMDII) 
in Chicago, one of the Manufacturing USA institutes, 
is in the process of developing an interactive, open 
cybersecurity test bed that leverages its existing 
24,000 square foot manufacturing floor, which 
contains computer numerical controlled (CNC) 
machines, assembly stations, a metrology lab, and 
numerous digital technologies. The vision of the 
DMDII cybersecurity test bed is to demonstrate 
recommended cyber hygiene practices, identify and 
share vulnerabilities, and create a neutral environment 
to disseminate learnings transparently across the 
manufacturing community.
In addition to improving the cybersecurity of IT 
and OT through technical measures, test beds also 
offer an opportunity for training on these systems. 
For example, Idaho National Laboratory’s Control 
Systems Analysis Center contains a control 
system environment specifically configured for 
an ICS cybersecurity training course. The course 
includes hands-on training and Red Team/
Blue Team training in attacking and defending 
operations of batch plants and an electrical 
distribution SCADA system.33 By engaging 
researchers from academia and industry, as well 
as students, more individuals can be exposed to 
important cybersecurity problems. 
Test beds also promote the creation of standard 
modes for OT systems. The manufacturing 
community needs a “lighthouse” for how to build 
a factory with cyber designed into its DNA; test 
beds can facilitate this development.
30 Aon, 2017 Global Risk Management Survey, at http://www.aon.com/2017-global-risk-management-survey/index.html.
31 http://energy.sandia.gov/energy/ssrei/gridmod/cyber-security-for-electric-infrastructure/scada-systems/.
32 https://www.nist.gov/publications/cybersecurity-test bed-industrial-control-systems.
33 Details on the training offered are available at https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Training-Available-Through-ICS-CERT. 
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Manufacturers would also benefit from the 
establishment of cyber ranges for testing 
components and system-level vulnerabilities, 
training teams, acting as sandboxes for new 
ideas, and providing a “cyber autopsy” capability. 
Manufacturing-specific IT/OT cyber ranges will 
create greater opportunities to test manufacturing 
systems and will increase the capability of internal 
Red Teams to discover flaws. 
WORKFORCE TRAINING
Although programs such as the National Initiative 
for Cybersecurity Education led by NIST (see 
Appendix 1) are helping to increase the skills 
and availability of cybersecurity professionals, 
manufacturing companies need workforce 
training programs/content to increase 
awareness of best practices without ambiguity 
and to avoid human error, the highest risk 
factor. Additional training needs to be available 
for existing OT and IT staff to instill consistent, 
unambiguous security methods and to expand 
knowledge of and access to available resources. 
Currently, IT and OT people do not communicate 
well, nor do IT and Human Resources/Safety staff, 
because of a language mismatch and competing 
priorities. There is immense value in creating 
baseline information and guidance on best 
practices in cybersecurity as outlined in the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework and related documents, 
how cybersecurity standards and resources are 
related, the circumstances in which they apply, and 
how certifications are related and used. 
It is important that workforce training includes 
relevant standards, such as ISO 27001 and ISA/
IEC 62443 (see Appendix 1). Even when not fully 
implemented, understanding the standards is 
essential to an effective cybersecurity response 
because they define minimum acceptable 
requirements for a cybersecurity program 
definition and operation. Expert trainers can 
convey the details and nuances of the standards 
that can form the foundations of consistent 
cybersecurity policies and actions, especially when 
in the form of non-normative guidance such as the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
Training “boot camps” would be rapid response 
training operations intended to raise awareness of 
best practices for key manufacturing personnel, 
while providing a “train the trainer” resource to 
rapidly raise the knowledge of the maximum 
number of manufacturing workers, in OT and 
IT. Training boot camps would likely evolve and 
specialize over time as general understanding 
and awareness is achieved and training specific 
to industries, operations, networks, and systems 
becomes more critical. For example, specific 
training will be needed on the certification 
requirements of specific products and technologies 
provided by organizations such as the ISA Security 
Compliance Institute and the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Training offerings 
will also need to evolve as threats and vulnerabilities 
change and defensive technologies emerge.
Existing federal, state, and private resources could 
be mobilized and coordinated to provide these 
training boot camps for manufacturers. Some of 
the Manufacturing USA institutes, federal programs 
including MEP and potentially the Department of 
Energy’s (DoE’s) Industrial Assessment Centers, 
educational institutions, and relevant trade 
association, professional societies, and industry 
organizations are resources that could be leveraged 
to provide broad access to training. 
MEETING CHALLENGES 
IN MANUFACTURING 
CYBERSECURITY
The July 2017 “Presidential Executive Order on 
Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing 
and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain 
Resiliency of the United States” demonstrates 
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the commitment by the current Administration to 
the strength and security of U.S. manufacturing. 
Multiple federal agencies already have strong 
programs in cybersecurity and important stakes 
in the cybersecurity of U.S. manufacturing (see 
Appendix 1). For example, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) programs to support and 
strengthen the defense industrial base have an 
obvious interest in manufacturing supply chain 
cybersecurity. With its mission to ensure robust, 
secure, and resilient industrial capabilities, the 
DoD’s Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base 
Policy is well positioned to address cybersecurity 
issues in manufacturing. The DoE maintains 
programs to support strong cybersecurity in 
energy production and distribution, especially 
the national electric power grid. The Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified four 
critical manufacturing sectors and has worked 
with industry to improve security and resilience. 
NIST has led the work on the Cybersecurity and 
Cyber Physical System Frameworks, as well as 
the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 
and the National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Education. The National Science Foundation 
(NSF) funds multiple academic research efforts 
on cybersecurity. Other federal departments and 
agencies also play a role in strengthening national 
cybersecurity. Tying these many federal efforts 
together with various state and local initiatives 
and coordinating them with the full spectrum of 
private commercial, consortium, foundation, and 
academic initiatives would result in more effective 
programs and greater attention to cybersecurity in 
companies of all sizes.
Given the broad and pervasive scope of the issues 
involved, and the diversity of organizations that 
already play a role, a public-private partnership 
focused on manufacturing cybersecurity 
should be created to provide necessary vision 
and coordination and to ensure the financial 
resources to implement the needed testing 
and training infrastructure. Within the context 
of the Presidential Executive Order, the federal 
government should take the lead in forming 
the public-private partnership while ensuring 
it includes contributions from state and 
local governments, academia, and a broad 
representation from the manufacturing base. 
Similarly, a private organization should be chosen 
to manage interactions with the private sector and 
to ensure broad-based private sector input.
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RECOMMENDATION 1: CREATE A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
FOCUSED ON MANUFACTURING SUPPLY CHAIN CYBERSECURITY.
Because of the unique characteristics of 
manufacturing operations and the potential 
extension of cyber threats through networked 
supply chains and digitized equipment in factories, 
manufacturing supply chain cybersecurity cannot 
be adequately addressed as the aggregated 
outcome of independent, uncoordinated, and 
localized efforts. The challenges will not be met 
through centralized control but through effective 
coordination of a decentralized national effort 
that can ensure the necessary local efforts have 
sufficient, consistent resources and expertise. 
The risks, challenges, and repercussions affect 
both the private and public sectors. Cybersecurity 
requirements in defense production pose particular 
challenges in areas such as ensuring part integrity 
and validation, tracking production as components 
move through the supply chain, and maintaining 
trustworthy design and production data for many 
years, sometimes decades. Therefore, an effective 
mechanism is needed for many stakeholders to 
work in partnership. A public-private partnership 
focused on manufacturing supply chain 
cybersecurity would provide such a mechanism. 
Specific tasks for such a partnership include:
a. Develop a national strategy for strengthening 
manufacturing cybersecurity that would 
identify and coordinate existing public 
and private efforts as well as additional 
resources sufficient to address the diverse 
testing, training, and R&D needed to meet the 
challenges in manufacturing cybersecurity,
b. Accelerate the application of existing 
cybersecurity technologies and practices to 
manufacturing to immediately lower the risks 
of cyberattacks, 
c. Coordinate facilities and mechanisms to 
address R&D challenges (see Chapter 3),
d. Support necessary industry-wide collaboration 
through mechanisms such as sector-specific 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 
(ISACs)/Information Sharing and Analysis 
Organizations (ISAOs) (see Chapter 4), 
e. Coordinate cyber ranges and test beds to
i. ensure comprehensive testing for 
vulnerabilities and effective patching in 
components, equipment, software, and other 
aspects of networked CPS of systems, 
ii. act as sandboxes to test new ideas safely 
and securely, 
iii. provide “cyber autopsy” capabilities, and
iv. promote the creation of standard models 
for OT systems.
f. Coordinate cyber ranges and test beds that will  
test for vulnerabilities in components, equipment, 
and the other myriad aspects of networked CPS 
of systems; act as a sandbox for new ideas; 
and provide “cyber autopsy” capabilities. Test 
beds can also promote the creation of standard 
models for OT systems, and
g. Coordinate the development of curricula and 
creation of boot camps for effective training 
of the general manufacturing workforce in 
cybersecurity best practices, as well as OT 
and IT technical professionals in evolving 
threats, emerging technological solutions, 
effective OT/IT interface, and CPS of 
systems engineering.
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and academic institutions. The tools and 
techniques needed, all in the context of systems of 
cyberspaces, include:
1. Robust part validation technology,
2. Automated risk assessment and detection tools,
3. Tools to audit the extent and nature of attacks,
4. Sharing, prioritizing, and analyzing intelligence 
on emerging threats and vulnerabilities,
5. Decoys for intelligence gathering, and 
6. Reference architectures with   
cross-cutting applicability.
R&D CHALLENGES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES
Although all manufacturers should immediately 
implement existing technologies and practices 
to mitigate cyber threats, research is needed 
to develop new tools and techniques. Because 
of the diverse and eclectic nature of digitized 
manufacturing technology and the integration 
of individual company networks throughout 
supply chains, this research requires funding and 
organization at a level higher than an individual 
plant or company. It must involve government, 
at both the state and national levels, industry, 
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AUTOMATED RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND DETECTION 
TOOLS
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework explains 
that cybersecurity risks cannot be effectively 
controlled until a mechanism is established to safely 
assess risk and detect threats using automation. 
Unfortunately, most current standards take the form 
of manual checklists. For instance, the historical 
method of conducting assessments involves the art 
of penetration testing. However, penetration testing 
does not scale, depends on human labor, and does 
not provide continuous assessment. The need for 
continuous assessment is particularly noteworthy 
because victims often have no clue when they have 
been attacked, in part because they have no way 
to detect the attack in real time. As cyber physical 
systems of systems grow increasingly large and 
interconnected, detection systems must respond 
more quickly and robustly than a team of humans 
can. R&D is needed to create technology that 
can replace penetration testing with continuous, 
automated assessment that can be safely used in 
the OT environment.
To automate risk assessment and detection, 
manufacturers need: 
 ➤ monitoring capabilities that can verify that 
parts are being assembled normally, 
 ➤ the ability to utilize data captured from the 
shop floor,
 ➤ the capability to analyze user and   
employee behavior,
 ➤ the capacity to monitor communication 
patterns for divergence, and
 ➤ technical solutions that can secure digital 
signatures (e.g., ledger technologies such   
as blockchain). 
Development of common risk assessment tools 
is also critical. Every manufacturer, no matter how 
large or small, faces risk that must be managed. 
ROBUST PART VALIDATION 
TECHNOLOGY
Because manufacturing systems typically consist 
of multiple, independently sourced components 
working together, robust part and material 
validation is necessary to ensure the security 
of both the manufacturing systems and the 
products produced. This challenge is important 
and unique to manufacturers because of the 
longevity of legacy systems and the diversity of 
machines and processes used.
To answer this challenge, research is needed 
on methodologies to provide part validation and 
risk assessment scoped for legacy equipment 
that includes:
 ➤ Techniques to identify existing attack vectors,
 ➤ Methods to anticipate future security 
vulnerabilities because what is not a 
vulnerability today could be one tomorrow (e.g., 
remote keys),
 ➤ Inventory systems to maintain validated part 
data on manufacturing parameters (where, 
when, and how the part was made) and 
lifecycle use,
 ➤ Methods to establish trust between machines 
of diverse ages from multiple vendors with a 
wide array of features and controllers, and 
 ➤ Defensive capabilities based on determining 
how an adversary could successfully attack 
cyber or physical targets.
Attack graphs are one example of an existing 
technique used to depict system vulnerabilities 
and to help devise responsive security measures. 
Based on Red Team attack findings, these graphs 
are typically built manually, which limits the size 
of the system that can be analyzed. Development 
of automated attack graph generators would 
facilitate analysis of the large, diverse systems 
typically found in manufacturing.
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34 Moody’s Investor Services, “Credit Strategy—Blockchain Technology: Robust, Cost-Effective Applications Key to Unlocking Blockchain’s  
Potential Credit Benefits,” July 2016, referenced at http://www.businessinsider.com/moodys-releases-definitive-list-of-every-
blockchain-project-out-there-2016-7/#-8.
SHARING, PRIORITIZING, AND 
ANALYZING INTELLIGENCE
For these common risk assessment and auditing 
tools to be truly effective manufacturers need 
mechanisms to share data with each other in 
a usable but secure fashion. ISACs/ISAOs or 
similar organizations (Recommendation 3) could 
effectively gather the collective data. Tools are 
needed to analyze the data, in as close to real 
time as possible and therefore in as automated a 
way as possible, to provide actionable intelligence 
to the manufacturing community. Patterns, 
trends, and impacts identified in the data would 
help ameliorate damage from existing attacks, 
while also informing the vendor and security 
communities of vulnerabilities, patch requirements, 
and ways to strengthen future system designs.
DECOYS FOR INTELLIGENCE 
GATHERING
Compiling the details of attacks on 
manufacturers and other industries is obviously 
necessary to create a robust data repository, 
but gaps are inevitable due to lax reporting or 
lack of knowledge that an attack has happened. 
Red teams and white hat hacking can help to fill 
some of these gaps. Another way to gather more 
intelligence is to use a well-structured program of 
decoys. The intelligence gathered from decoys, 
combined with the data on threats and risks 
collected from live breaches and discovered by 
white hat hackers, would allow manufacturers to 
identify and analyze trends to proactively improve 
the cybersecurity of their systems. Obviously, 
securing the nature of the decoys would be a 
paramount concern.
It is inefficient and costly for every company to 
reinvent its own protection or mitigation for every 
new kind of threat that develops. Therefore, the 
research community must develop common risk 
assessment tools that can be tailored to unique 
risk models. 
TOOLS TO AUDIT THE EXTENT 
AND NATURE OF ATTACKS
In addition to development of tools to prevent and 
deter cyberattacks, further research is needed to 
advance tools to audit the extent of successful 
attacks. To be confident that an attack has been 
fully audited, the ability to check some kind of 
digital signature is required because the attacker 
could try to cover his/her tracks. One potential 
solution is to use automated ledger technology, 
such as blockchain, to prevent the modification of 
digital signatures in the data. In theory, blockchain 
data are secure by design and could be suitable 
for maintaining full lifecycle data on both parts 
and processes. 
The ability to create blockchains, or similarly 
secure data, in operational real time must be 
realized before the technology can be applied to 
manufacturing processes. Many research and 
implementation efforts are currently under way to 
apply blockchain technology to industries other 
than finance. For instance, Kouvola Innovation 
in Finland is testing the use of blockchains in 
supply chain management. A Nevada startup, 
Filament, is leveraging blockchain to build 
distributed communication networks of sensors. 
IBM, Intel, Philips, and other corporations are also 
extending the use of blockchain to areas relevant 
to manufacturing.34 
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FIGURE 4. GENERALIZED, MANUFACTURING-ORIENTED REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE.
SOURCE: SUDARSAN RACHURI, PRESENTATION AT CLEAN ENERGY SMART MANUFACTURING INNOVATION INSTITUTE.
DEVELOPMENT OF REFERENCE 
ARCHITECTURES WITH 
CROSSCUTTING APPLICABILITY 
In the modern age, an increasing number of 
industrial sensor-to-actuation, including human-
in-loop, control systems are managed through 
computers and networked data communications. 
Cyber physical systems security reference 
architectures define the IT and OT functions, 
standards, and integration requirements that 
can be consistently addressed with a full range 
of manufacturing device touchpoints, a diversity 
of manufacturing operations and enterprises, 
and different vendor control, modeling, and 
automation platforms. The NIST CPS Framework 
provides guidance on the attributes of a reference 
architecture for manufacturing. It explains that the 
architecture should reflect key functional layers 
that are sufficiently decoupled so that each layer 
can be modified and replaced without unwittingly 
affecting the other layers. Layers typically include 
the physical components, networked systems, 
data management, applications, and collaboration 
and business processes. Figure 4 illustrates an 
example of a generalized, manufacturing-oriented 
reference architecture.35
Components that contain sensors and/or actuators 
should have an appropriate level of awareness of 
physical location and time. Characteristics of OT 
and IT components should be well defined using 
standardized component/service definitions, 
descriptions, and component catalogs. Support 
for legacy component integration and migration 
should include the physical artifacts, software, 
protocols, semantics, and other critical attributes. 
Data exchange is a prominent aspect and the 
35 https://www.cesmii.org/s/CESMII-Kickoff-Sudarsan-Rachuri-DOE.pdf. 
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nature of the data and their reliability, type, identity, 
and discovery are all key attributes. Data are 
typically “fused” or combined with other data for 
anonymization or enrichment, or for summarization 
for the benefit of users. Access is often constrained 
by “rights” or “privileges.” To support domain 
flexibility, component definitions need to be flexible 
and open ended.
The architecture should support flexibility in 
virtual system creation and adaptation and a 
large range of application sizes, complexities, and 
workloads—that is, the same components that are 
used in a simple application should also be usable 
in very large, complex, distributed systems. The 
architecture should allow for composition from 
independent, decoupled components for flexibility, 
robustness, and resilience to changing situations. 
Ideally the components can be assembled and 
scaled quickly, even during runtime. Interfaces 
to these components should be based on 
well-defined, interpretable, and unambiguous 
standards. A key to supporting diversity of 
application and scalability is to allow internal 
component flexibility while providing external 
interoperability through standardized interfaces.
Reference architectures must be broad enough 
with recommended principles and layouts to work 
for many companies in many different sectors and 
must include the engineering specifications for a full 
range of equipment and operations. Cyberattacks 
often happen between the zones of control—in 
the seams, so to speak. A poorly integrated 
system will be more vulnerable to attacks.
Security is a necessary feature to ensure that the 
integrity of the information used, processed, stored, 
and transferred is preserved and kept confidential 
where needed. The nature of CPS not only 
increases the consequences of a breach but also 
introduces additional types of vulnerabilities. For 
example, timing in a CPS has vulnerabilities different 
from traditional data vulnerabilities considered in 
cybersecurity. Security must be built by design 
to ensure sufficient flexibility to support a diverse 
set of applications. This security should include 
component security and access control, as well as 
timing, data, and communications security. Security 
should also be considered in combination with 
other prioritized and potentially conflicting concerns, 
such as privacy, safety, reliability, and resilience, in a 
comprehensive risk management framework. 
New reference architectures for these systems 
would improve manufacturers’ awareness of the 
state of their cybersecurity. Additionally, provision 
of reference architectures for control systems and 
organizational/process models that are included 
in the design of these cyber systems will enable 
establishment of best practices that will increase 
their security. Reference architectures address the 
fact that many manufacturers do not know what 
best practices currently look like.
The reference architecture technically must 
be broad enough in recommended principles, 
structures, and layouts to work for many 
companies in many different sectors and provide 
engineering specifications for a full range of 
hardware and software systems. A poorly 
integrated CPS will be more vulnerable to attack. 
The principles provided in section 2 of the NIST 
CPS and Version 1.8 of the Industrial Internet 
Consortium’s Industrial Internet Reference 
Architecture36 provide excellent starting points for 
the development of the needed architectures.
CRITICAL FUNDAMENTAL 
R&D OBJECTIVES
Today’s approach to securing systems and 
communications is largely monolithic and 
managed centrally. The advent of the Internet 
of Things/Internet of Everything (IoT/IoE), 
36 http://www.iiconsortium.org/IIRA.htm. 
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interconnected systems, and interconnected 
companies in smart and digital supply chains 
demands a decentralized approach to security 
in which the user/owner controls the various 
assets (i.e., devices and data). Dynamic 
business relationships that encompass cyber 
and physical assets will result in interconnected 
communication, cyberspace, data and cloud 
systems; multi-company partnerships and third-
party responsibilities must also be considered. 
End-to-end management of time and actuation 
assumes new characteristics and introduces new 
kinds of vulnerabilities. Reference architectures 
must design in security. Conceptual research 
is needed to consider the next-generation 
network, communications, and security 
architecture and management structure to 
avoid bolting another security solution onto 
today’s infrastructure. This is the type of 
research that the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) is adept at defining and funding. 
A number of critical R&D activities should 
commence now and be supported to evolve with 
changing future conditions:
1. Apply systems engineering methodologies 
to building cyber supply chain reference 
architectures that design in security and 
resilience, treating linked cyberspaces as 
a systems assembly design/interface risk 
problem and emphasizing manufacturing 
security system and practice reusability. 
Systems engineering methods can be used 
to develop the systems of CPS reference 
architectures that account for the intra- and 
inter-level interfaces of cyberspace security 
with cross-cutting applicability.37 As an 
example, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 
has evolved a design methodology known 
as Integrated Model Centric Engineering38 
(IMCE, and the related Model-Based System 
Engineering [MBSE]39). JPL has adopted 
MBSE/IMCE40 and has refined its predictive 
modeling and model synthesis capability 
under the Defense Advanced Research 
Program Agency’s (DARPA’s) F6 program.41 
This approach enables experimentation, 
testing, verification, and validation of various 
combinations of systems technologies against 
current processes and benchmarks in a 
virtual environment, and the selection of those 
technologies to optimize objectives before 
committing deployment costs. These methods 
can be used to create a baseline for existing 
technology, quantify areas of vulnerability, and 
identify critical priorities for improvement. 
2. Create reference architectures for 
manufacturing IT/OT systems so that product 
selections can be flexible. Manufacturers will 
have greater trust in a reference architecture 
that is formed by a broad coalition of 
researchers with the backing of government 
agencies, rather than one that is distributed 
by a single software company. Influential 
cyber ranges would aid in the creation of 
such a reference architecture. Development 
of reference architectures will require a 
concerted, systematic, and interdisciplinary 
(OT/IT) engineering approach. 
37 NIST Special Publication 800-160, Systems Security Engineering, and ISO 15288 provide guidance for engineering trustworthy, secure  
systems. See R. Ross, M. McEvilley, and J. Oren, Systems Security Engineering, Nov. 2016, at https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-160.
38 T. Bayer, et al., “An Operations Concept for Integrated Model-Centric Engineering at JPL,” Paper #1120 IEEE Aerospace Conference, March  
6-13, 2010. DOI:10.1109/AERO.2010. 5446799.
39 J. Long, “Model-Based Systems Engineering for Project Success: The Complete Process.” INCOSE International. Symposium, 20: 1502–
1644, 2010. DOI: 10.1002/j.2334-5837.2010.tb01154.x.
40 T. Bayer et al., “An Operations Concept for Integrated Model-Centric Engineering at JPL,” Paper #1120 IEEE Aerospace Conference, March  
6-13, 2010. DOI:10.1109/AERO.2010. 5446799.
41 S. Cornford, et al., “Evaluating a Fractionated Spacecraft System: A Business Case Tool for DARPA’s F6 Program,” IEEE Aerospace   
Conference, March 3-10, 2012. DOI:10.1109/AERO. 2012.6187435.
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3. Develop systems of systems architecture 
that integrate design and analysis with cloud 
services. Designing the security of multiple 
things is as important as automated checking 
and validation. The cloud is just someone 
else’s computer. Cloud connections are more 
numerous and pervasive than many managers 
realize, which implies the need for policies to 
delineate appropriate connection procedures.
4. Define and develop a supply chain 
cybersecurity framework that includes robust 
part validation technologies, methods to audit 
attacks and responses, a common language 
across multiple functional departments, and 
application of appropriate standards such as 
ISA/IEC 62443 and ISO 27001.
5. Develop a framework of hardware and 
software “trust anchors” for on-demand 
party-to-party and party-to-multi-party 
compartmentalized data management 
with manufacturing hardware and software 
systems. Most current strategies focus on 
ensuring local processing of data, which is 
likely a short-term solution.
CRITICAL NEAR-TERM  
R&D OBJECTIVES
R&D activities that would contribute to critical 
near-term objectives include:  
1. Take advantage of cyber supply chain security 
opportunities from systems of systems 
engineering approaches. If Secure A + 
Secure B is NOT secure, then what must 
be done to A and B together to make A + 
B secure or to mitigate impacts? How can 
systems security be verified and validated 
rapidly when cyberspaces are brought 
together for business purposes? Applying a 
systems methodology would illuminate the 
existing taxonomy of relevant standards and 
compare these standards with an ideal state 
model to identify gaps and ways to address 
them. Using this ideal state model, “levels” 
of cybersecurity for manufacturers could be 
defined and described.
2. Develop automated tools for assessing risk, 
detecting attacks, and determining the extent 
of attack. Many such tools currently exist, but 
they are not tuned for manufacturing use or 
the operational requirements of a production 
setting. Research is needed to determine how 
to use these IT tools in an operational setting. 
In particular, development of analytics-
based detection tools for both IT and OT and 
use of digital twins would be beneficial to 
manufacturing applications. 
3. Develop automated, robust part validation 
technology to assure that parts meet design 
specifications and to track part providence 
throughout the supply chain from initial 
production through final assembly and 
customer delivery. Automated ledger 
technology such as blockchain shows 
promise for application in manufacturing to 
create trusted environments.
Achieving these critical near- and long-term 
technologies, tools, and architectures requires a 
research program focused on the cybersecurity 
needs of existing and evolving manufacturing 
systems. The federal government should: 
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RECOMMENDATION 2: ESTABLISH A FEDERAL RESEARCH INITIATIVE 
TO ADDRESS BOTH NEAR- AND LONG-TERM CYBERSECURITY 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN MANUFACTURING.
Fundamental research should address systems-
of-systems engineering methodologies for cyber 
physical systems with designed-in cybersecurity 
and resilience, treating linked cyber spaces as 
systems design/interface risk problems. Critical 
development activities that should commence 
now and require support to evolve include:
a. Create systems and security reference 
architectures for manufacturing that define the 
OT and IT functions, standards, and integration 
requirements. The reference architectures 
should be applicable across a diverse range 
of manufacturing devices, operations, and 
enterprises, and different vendor control, 
modeling, and automation platforms.
b. Establish software and hardware trust 
anchor frameworks for securely connecting 
and managing many devices, systems, and 
data in manufacturing systems without 
central management.
c. Develop systems-of-systems architecture design 
and analysis that integrate with cloud services. 
R&D activities that would contribute to critical near-
term objectives include: 
a. Automated vulnerability assessment and 
detection tools. Many tools currently exist but are 
not tuned for manufacturing or the operational 
requirements of a production setting. 
b. Analytics-based detection—networks or 
machines—and use of digital twins.
c. Tools to audit the extent of attacks.
d. Automated, robust part validation technology, 
including automated distributed ledger 
technologies such as blockchain, for trusted 
parts and data validation. 
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CHAPTER 4
ESTABLISH MECHANISMS FOR 
INDUSTRY COLLABORATION
STRONG CYBERSECURITY 
REQUIRES COLLABORATION
Leaders in private industry and government are 
becoming increasingly aware that security is a major 
issue for manufacturers as both production facilities 
and multiple product segments become connected. 
This “connectedness” will cause a massive increase 
in the number of networked devices. Qualification of 
the parts, materials, models, sensors, controllers, 
and processes, while protecting the IP they 
embody, will require stringent multi-industry, 
multinational cooperation.
Trade associations, professional societies, and 
other groups could provide the mechanism for the 
needed collaboration, but models used widely in 
other industries are instructive. ISACs/ISAOs provide 
a mechanism for cooperation among companies in 
similar industries to facilitate fault-free, anonymous 
sharing of incidents, threats, vulnerabilities, best 
practices, and solutions (see Box 1).42 Some existing 
ISACs/ISAOs include manufacturers as members, 
but none are focused on manufacturing. 
Manufacturing ISACs/ISAOs could:  
1. Develop a data repository of anonymous 
submissions of cyberattacks. A data repository 
with anonymized data from many companies 
that allows manufacturers to identify and analyze 
trends would be a boon to both the manufacturing 
and the cybersecurity research communities.
42 In February 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13691 promoting private-sector cybersecurity information sharing that 
directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to encourage the development of ISAOs and to create an ISAO standards  
organization. Details can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/isao. 
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2. Facilitate the implementation of decoys for 
intelligence gathering. Although compiling 
the details of attacks on manufacturers and 
others is obviously necessary to create a 
robust data repository, relying only on the 
data from noticed and/or reported attacks 
forces responders to wait until a threat 
occurs in the wild. Red teams and white hat 
hackers can help fill some of these gaps. 
Another way to gather more intelligence is to 
use decoys. The intelligence gathered from 
decoys, combined with the data on threats 
and risks collected from live breaches and 
discovered by white hat hackers, would allow 
manufacturers to identify and analyze trends 
proactively to improve the cybersecurity of 
their systems.
BOX 1. ISACs AND ISAOs
INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTERS
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are sector-specific membership organizations 
that facilitate sharing information on cyber and physical threats.  Typically member-driven non-
profit organizations 22 ISACs currently operate, focused on critical infrastructure sectors such as 
financial services, electricity, healthcare, and oil and natural gas. At least four ISACs—Automotive, 
Aviation, Defense Industrial Base, and Supply Chain—have manufacturers as members. The 
Automotive ISAC limits membership to light and heavy-duty vehicle OEMs and suppliers and 
commercial vehicle companies. The Aviation ISAC includes airlines, airports, satellite, engine, and 
equipment segments of the industry. Membership in the Defense Industrial Base ISAC is open to 
companies with responsibility for protection of the defense industrial base infrastructure.
INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATIONS
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) are organized more broadly than ISACs, 
often based on geographic regions, such as Northeast Ohio, Maryland, and Arizona, as well as 
industries such as legal services, credit unions, and retail. Among the 23 ISAOs, some include 
manufacturing members: the Medical Device ISAO and the IoT ISAO are examples. In 2015, 
the DHS funded the ISAO Standards Organization at the University of Texas to identify a set of 
voluntary standards for the creation and functioning of ISAOs.
3. Facilitate the prioritization and sharing of 
intelligence. Intelligence sharing might best 
be accomplished through a public-private 
partnership that could take advantage of the 
intelligence-gathering capabilities of federal 
agencies such as DHS and DoD, combined 
with the industry coordination and reporting 
provided by the industry-specific ISACs/ISAOs.
ISACs/ISAOs should become a trusted, integral 
part of the national manufacturing ecosystem, but 
they can only be effective if manufacturers join/
form relevant ISACs/ISAOs and actively participate 
in them by sharing data and acting on the resulting 
intelligence. In turn, active participation can only 
be expected if the current complacency among 
manufacturers is overcome.
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COMPLACENCY: BARRIER 
TO COLLABORATION 
Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to 
strengthening cybersecurity in manufacturing is 
complacency among manufacturers. Because 
there has not been a reported major incident 
in U.S. manufacturing, there is not sufficient 
financial or regulatory incentive to move 
beyond cursory action. Cyberattacks in other 
industries, regardless of their similarity to 
manufacturing, such as the recent well-known 
attacks on Sony, Target, and Yahoo, have not been 
a sufficient motivator to manufacturers to invest 
in cybersecurity. SMMs—typically defined as 
manufacturers with fewer than 500 employees—
comprise greater than 90 percent of the U.S. 
manufacturing base but do not see security as 
a threat to their operations, do not perceive a 
competitive advantage to investing in security, and 
often cannot afford the cost of IT professionals 
skilled in cybersecurity. 
Lack of incentive to act is compounded by 
significant lack of understanding (or confusion) 
on what actions to take. Few manufacturers 
have staff with the skills needed to address 
cybersecurity challenges. The multifaceted 
impacts of a cyberattack not only on production 
but also on occupational health and safety, 
insurance, liability, and financial compliance are 
only just being recognized.
The pervasive, serious, and rapidly evolving nature 
of cyber threats to manufacturers of all sizes in all 
industries requires flexible, cost-effective solutions 
best driven by market incentives rather than by 
regulatory requirements. Cybersecurity needs to 
become an ingrained part of every manufacturer’s 
culture, embedded in management decisions, 
workforce training, and investment calculations. 
An obvious analogy is the emergence of a quality 
culture in the 1980s, initially driven by Japanese 
competition but eventually becoming pervasive 
throughout U.S. manufacturing. Having a formal 
system in place to assure high-quality production, 
often based on ISO 9001 and related standards, is 
frequently a condition for winning business with 
OEMs. Similar broad adoption of cybersecurity 
standards, such as ISA/IEC 62443 and ISO 27001 
(see Appendix 1), driven by requirements from 
large customers and filtering through supply 
chains, could provide a competitive advantage and 
the market demand needed for manufacturers to 
invest in cybersecurity.43 
Another potential market driver of stronger 
cybersecurity practices is creating a price 
mechanism that would value strong cybersecurity. 
Cybersecurity insurance is one such mechanism. 
In a recent survey of global risk management, 
Aon found that cybercrime is the top concern 
of businesses in North America among all 
respondents but it was not one of the top three 
concerns among manufacturers. The smaller 
the company, the less likely cybersecurity was 
named as a high risk. Of the companies surveyed, 
manufacturing companies were among the 
least likely to buy cyber insurance, and few 
manufacturers have tried to quantify the potential 
costs of a cyberattack.44 Without financial impact 
metrics, the needed investments to mitigate the 
risks of cyberattacks are difficult to justify. 
Here, too, collaboration is essential to share 
information on the frequency and nature of 
cyberattacks, their impacts on the affected 
businesses, and steps businesses take to 
ameliorate the impacts and to recover quickly 
from the attacks. If market incentives were created 
that encourage manufacturers to purchase 
cybersecurity insurance, then manufacturers would 
also have incentive to share information as a way to 
ensure premiums are both fair and minimized.
43 The system used by Six Sigma practitioners to designate levels of expertise and experience by “belt” color (i.e., green, black, master black)  
might also be applied to cybersecurity professionals.
44 Aon, 2017 Global Risk Management Survey.  
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Creating the needed market incentives 
and sufficient participation in collaborative 
organizations can only be accomplished by senior 
corporate leadership. A working group of Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) from a representative 
cross-section of manufacturing industries, 
combined with senior government officials and 
academics, could raise and maintain awareness 
on cybersecurity in manufacturing. Specific action 
items for this working group include:
1. Create market incentives for strong 
cybersecurity similar to the national “quality 
assurance” program that emerged in U.S. 
manufacturing in the 1980s.45 Awareness, 
conviction, adoption, and execution of 
cybersecurity measures must become a 
competitive advantage within organizations 
throughout the manufacturing sector. Ideally, 
solutions will be market rather than regulation 
driven to ensure long-term flexibility and 
incentives for continuous improvement. 
Industry groups should work with government 
to facilitate awareness and education and 
to support efforts to define the implications 
of cybersecurity incidents. Industry should 
lead the discussions to advance common 
understanding of how cybersecurity incidents 
will be handled, including information sharing, 
mitigation, and solutions. 
2. Create a cybersecurity standards registration 
program, similar to ISO 9001 and other 
related quality systems, that defines effective 
cybersecurity policies and practices and 
confirms the organizations’ commitment to 
continuous improvement. The ISA/IEC 62443 
and ISO 27001 standards for cybersecurity 
provide readily available mechanisms to gage 
manufacturers’ cybersecurity practices. Like 
quality systems, independent auditors would 
confirm that effective cybersecurity efforts are in 
place, and markets would favor manufacturers 
with the cybersecurity registration. 
3. Form a national cybersecurity certification 
laboratory to eliminate the need for each 
company to test every product/process. 
Underwriters Laboratory could serve as a 
model.46 Certification would require definition 
of a base level of security for software and 
hardware for products and processes. 
4. Encourage all manufacturers, regardless of 
size or industry, to participate in industry-
specific ISACs and to implement the 
cybersecurity practices identified in the 
Repeatable and Adaptive Implementation 
Tiers in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. 
To help smaller firms, the working group 
should encourage them to work with 
their local MEP center to implement the 
Cybersecurity Framework practices and to 
become compliant with the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 
on cybersecurity (see Appendix 1). 
5. Working with appropriate involvement from 
government and academia, converge on an 
overall taxonomy, guidelines, and standards 
for IT/OT interfaces, authentication, protection 
from different caliber of attacks, and 
procedures for reporting attacks.
6. Learn from and apply approaches already in 
use in the financial and energy sectors.
Creating the needed market incentives and 
mechanisms for essential multi-company 
collaboration can be accomplished with the 
following actions:
45  Kenneth Krieg, presentation to MForesight Cybersecurity Workshop, March 14, 2017.
46 http://industries.ul.com/cybersecurity. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3: 
ESTABLISH MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC 
ISACS, ISAOS, OR SIMILAR 
ORGANIZATIONS.
ISACs/ISAOs, or similar industry-led organizations, 
can facilitate fault-free, anonymous sharing of 
incidents, threats, vulnerabilities, best practices, 
and solutions. Proactive collaborative activities 
that manufacturing-specific ISACs/ISAOs could 
initiate include: 
a. Develop a data repository of anonymous 
submissions of cyberattacks, and disseminate 
anonymized reports to manufacturers on a 
regular schedule,
b. Coordinate use of decoys for intelligence 
gathering and sharing,
c. Create industry test beds, cyber ranges, and 
demonstration facilities to safely prototype and 
test OT and IT security technologies, identify 
system-level vulnerabilities, and provide a 
“cyber autopsy” capability, and
d. Identify and disseminate best practices and 
provide training platforms/curricula.
RECOMMENDATION 4: 
ESTABLISH AN EXECUTIVE-
LEVEL WORKING GROUP.
An executive-level working group is needed 
to provide a strong industry voice to advocate 
for and motivate industry action to strengthen 
cybersecurity.  Using quality system certifications 
as a model, the working group should drive 
market-based incentives for stronger cybersecurity 
in manufacturing.  The goal should be for most 
manufacturers to implement the practices 
identified in the Repeatable and Adaptive 
Implementation Tiers in the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, and to meet the requirements detailed 
in relevant standards such as ISA/IEC 62443 and 
ISO 27001. The working group should also:
a. Promote participation by all manufacturers in 
their industry’s ISAC/ISAO,
b. Facilitate the emergence of financial risk 
management procedures that can apply to 
cybersecurity practices, and
c. Communicate with executives in other at-risk 
economic sectors such as finance and energy 
to ensure that solutions developed for those 
industries are applied in manufacturing.
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CHAPTER 5
CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR 
SUPPLY CHAIN CYBERSECURITY
environment as possible. Each manufacturing 
operation consists of people, material handling 
and processing equipment, sensors, control 
systems, models, and the data that emanate 
from them. 
Manufacturing combines complex OT with multiple 
levels of data, control systems, and networks, that 
require attention to OT and IT together throughout 
the enterprise. This combination of OT and IT 
systems is referred to as cyber physical systems.47 
Manufacturing cyber supply chains are dominated 
by systems of CPS that bridge multiple purposes, 
time, and data domains.
Manufacturing still functions with a large base 
of old but still serviceable equipment and 
47 As defined in the NIST CPS Framework, CPS are smart systems that include engineered interacting networks of physical and   
computational components.
CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
SECURITY IN MANUFACTURING
Manufacturing is the orchestration of multiple 
operations that move and change materials 
and assemble parts into market-driven end 
products that meet customer needs. In addition 
to factories, manufacturing enterprises include 
research facilities, distribution centers, business 
management operations, and a host of vendors 
and suppliers that form extensive value chains. 
Competitive imperatives require that products be 
produced consistently, predictably, and with zero 
safety incidents, with well-defined precision, and 
at as low a cost and as low an impact on the 
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operations; therefore, cybersecurity risks are 
not confined to advanced, automated factories. 
Risks are aggravated by old, digital controls 
but can be mitigated by proprietary, closed 
system deployments. As manufacturers invest 
in networking old systems and new advanced 
sensors, modeling, control, robotics, Asset 
Performance Management (APM) systems, and 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems across 
supply chains, security risks increase because the 
number of CPS increases and networks become 
more complex.
The sheer growth of digital devices and systems 
deployed throughout manufacturing has already 
created a large deficit in the number of workers 
with the necessary cybersecurity systems 
expertise. The potential number of “weakest-
link” cyberattack vulnerabilities is a function 
of constantly evolving technology, gaps in 
organization and workforce skills, growing 
numbers of CPS interfaces, and increasingly 
numerous and sophisticated cyberattacks.
DIGITIZED, NETWORKED 
MANUFACTURING: 
OPPORTUNITY AND RISK
Key characteristics of manufacturing make 
industry inherently vulnerable to cyberattack. 
Yet trends in automation, computerization, and 
networked and tightly integrated supply chains, 
and the emergence of the IoT introduce new 
vulnerabilities that will be increasingly difficult to 
manage unless appropriate, sufficient investments 
are made soon. These trends are driven by a 
combination of market demand and the availability 
of new technologies that provide not only new 
functionality but also new sources of risk.
Customer demand for product diversity and 
customization is forcing manufacturers to adapt 
quickly with flexible, dynamic operations. New 
materials, sophisticated design and modeling 
tools, advanced computer controls, and real-
time production and market information enable 
manufacturers to respond rapidly to changing 
customer needs. Pressure to be more flexible 
pushes deep into supply chains,48 affecting 
multiple organizations and requiring a level of 
communication through integrated ERP and 
operational systems that automate supply chain 
management. The cybersecurity landscape is 
one of increasing precision, frequent change, and 
dynamic production such that reference behaviors, 
operations, data flows, and data patterns also 
should be established dynamically. 
The proliferation of digital devices and data 
applications that must be interoperable within a 
given company and across multiple companies in 
a supply chain creates substantial management 
challenges. With many responsible parties, the 
total system-of-systems cannot be readily or 
centrally managed, and cannot be treated as 
a collection of individual, compartmentalized 
systems. Achieving essential interoperability 
is becoming more difficult as complexity 
increases. Simply retrofitting existing supply 
chain management applications raises overall 
system and security complexity. A new approach 
is needed that begins with the simplest problems 
and that draws on reusable, rather than generative, 
data application design and engineering. 
For example, every device that generates or 
acts on data needs a “trust anchor” that not only 
grants an authorized user access to necessary 
data at a granular level but also limits that user’s 
access to what is necessary. Trust anchors 
standardize how data and ownership for each 
hardware and software component in a system is 
documented. They enable business-to-business 
data agreements to be managed securely at the 
48 For more details on next-generation supply chains, see the recent MForesight report, T. Mahoney and S. Helper, Ensuring American  
Manufacturing Leadership Through Next-Generation Supply Chains, Ann Arbor, MI: MForesight, 2017.
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right levels of granularity. The trust anchor also 
records details about how access was gained. 
Put simply, the set of entities that can create, read, 
copy, and/or modify data on any given device must 
be controlled. In manufacturing, trust anchors 
need to be engineered to avoid introducing delay 
into the production control networks. There is a 
reasonable amount of risk that, without such trust 
anchors, these hardware and software systems 
will be security break-entry points, especially as 
more devices are interconnected through the IoT.
CYBERSECURITY AND 
CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
FRAMEWORKS
NIST has developed a Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, and its 
public working group is developing a Framework 
for Cyber Physical Systems.49 The NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) is a risk-based 
approach to managing cybersecurity consisting 
of three parts: Framework Core, Framework 
Implementation Tiers, and Framework Profiles, 
summarized as follows:
1. The Framework Core is a set of activities 
and desired outcomes that are common 
across critical infrastructure sectors. It 
consists of five functions: Identify, Protect, 
Detect, Respond, and Recover, which together 
provide the basis for strategic management 
of cybersecurity risks.
2. Framework Implementation Tiers describe 
the extent to which an organization’s 
cybersecurity management practices are 
mature and pervasive. Within each Tier, an 
organization’s cyber risk management is 
assessed in four areas: Risk Management 
Process, Integrated Risk Management 
Program, External Participation, and Cyber 
Supply Chain Risk Management. The four 
Tiers include:
1. Partial—In this tier, risk management 
practices are not formalized. There is 
limited awareness of cyber risk at an 
organizational level and no processes to 
collaborate with external organizations. 
The firm does not understand supply chain 
risks and has no processes in place to 
identify or mitigate them.
2. Risk informed—Risk management 
practices are formalized, but an 
organization-wide approach is not 
established. The organization is aware of 
its role in a larger ecosystem but has no 
formalized capability to interact or share 
information. The firm understands cyber 
supply chain risks but has no formal 
programs to manage the risks internally or 
with its suppliers.
3. Repeatable—Risk management practices 
are formally approved, expressed as policy, 
and regularly updated. Consistent methods 
are in place to monitor risk consistently, 
respond effectively, and communicate 
across the organization. The organization 
understands external dependencies, 
enabling collaboration. Enterprise risk 
management policies, processes, and 
procedures are used to manage cyber 
supply chain risks; formal agreements 
are in place to communicate baseline 
requirements to suppliers and partners.
4. Adaptive—The organization actively 
adapts to lessons learned. An integrated 
risk management program recognizes the 
relationship between business objectives 
and cybersecurity risk, and includes a 
49 Cyber Physical Systems Public Working Group, Framework for Cyber Physical Systems, Release 1.0, May 2016.
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budget based on current and predicted 
risks. Cybersecurity risk management is 
part of the culture, focused on continuous 
improvement. Real-time or near real-
time information is shared with suppliers 
and partners proactively; both formal 
and informal mechanisms are used to 
maintain strong relationships throughout 
the supply chain.
Organizations in Tier 1 (Partial) are encouraged 
to move up at least one Tier, but Tiers do not 
represent maturity levels. Each organization 
judges what combination of management 
practices is appropriate for its situation to reduce 
cybersecurity risk in a cost-effective manner. For 
manufacturers, greater attention to supply chain 
risk management must necessarily be a high 
priority in reducing their cyber risk profile.
3. Framework Profiles are the alignment of 
standards, guidelines, and practices in a 
particular implementation of the Framework 
Core. A “current state” Profile can identify 
existing activities, risks, and business drivers 
to assess the organization’s current level 
of cyber risk, then use the current Profile to 
establish priorities and initiatives to achieve 
a desired “future state” Profile. The Profiles 
can be used, in the context of the Framework 
Core and Implementation Tiers, to conduct 
self-assessments and to provide the basis for 
consistent direction and communication within 
and between organizations. 
The CSF provides general guidelines for sound 
cybersecurity management practices and is broadly 
applicable to multiple types of organizations, 
including manufacturers. For relatively 
unsophisticated companies, the CSF provides 
a good primer on basic cybersecurity practices 
and a roadmap for improving those practices 
applicable to any level of corporate sophistication 
and resources. The Framework for Cyber Physical 
Systems includes more technical detail addressing 
the complex device and equipment interactions 
typical in a manufacturing environment.
CYBER SUPPLY CHAIN 
SECURITY AND RESILIENCE
OT refers to any physical operating equipment at 
any level of the production process (i.e., machine, 
process, line operation, factory). In modern 
factories, OT is connected using IT networks 
defined by the role of the equipment in the 
production process. OT/IT levels include:
1. Devices (e.g., sensors, equipment, and 
actuators) that are associated with or 
connected to local factory information and 
data systems (often multiple),
2. Combinations of devices that form an operation 
within a factory and are connected to a factory 
operation cyberspace or linked cyberspaces,
3. Combinations of operations that form a line 
operation within a factory and are connected to 
a factory cyberspace or to linked cyberspaces,
4. Combination of line operations within a 
company that form cross-factory enterprise 
operations and are interconnected to multiple 
company cyberspaces, and
5. Combinations of line operations and/or 
company enterprise operations that form 
supply chain enterprises and involve inter-
company, interconnected cyberspaces.
Cyber supply chain security and resilience 
implies that security and resilience comprise 
nested security practices. Each time cyberspaces 
are interconnected to create a new operational 
level, a new, higher level cyberspace is generated 
for which security must be addressed as a 
combination of cyberspaces. Expressed in terms 
of the NIST CPS framework, cyber supply chains 
are systems of CPS in which the architectural 
constructs of each of the cyberspace levels 
are applied recursively or iteratively to create a 
nested structure. Figure 5 illustrates the functional 
composition of CPS as a system-of-systems.
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FIGURE 5. FUNCTIONAL COMPOSITION OF CPS AS A SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS.
SOURCE: CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS PUBLIC WORKING GROUP
This combination of cyberspaces, increasingly 
essential in manufacturing, raises two critical 
points that complicate security, namely:
a. Secure A at any level + Unsecure B at any 
level results in Unsecure (A + B)
b. Secure A at any level + Secure B at any level 
does NOT equal Secure (A + B) 
Cyber supply chain security and resilience require not 
only each organization to address internal Core and 
Profile Frameworks but also a highly collaborative, 
cross-company approach to build a security 
framework for the total supply chain ecosystem.50
Five priority areas of emphasis drive 
manufacturing-specific cyber supply chain 
security needs. These relate directly to the 
manufacturing-specific attributes listed above:
1. System-level security and cyber-resilience: 
Cybersecurity starts with the technical and 
organizational cores and processes for 
factory-level information and data security.
2. Integrity of manufactured goods from 
design through the factory floor: Cyber 
supply chain security must be defined and 
addressed in terms of product qualifications, 
chain of custody, validated manufacturing 
conditions and supplier data integrity, and 
legacy operating equipment.
3. Securely connecting the factory to the 
supply chain: Market and technology 
dynamics increasingly dictate that all factories 
build cyberspaces that can digitally connect 
to other cyberspaces to form an overall 
supply chain cyberspace, a system- of-
systems. The multiple organizations forming 
these supply chain cyberspaces cannot be 
subject to weakest link security, creating an 
imperative for all suppliers to maintain robust 
cybersecurity as a condition for participation.
50 Mahoney and Helper, p. 39.
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4. Cyber intelligence (gathering, assessing, 
and sharing): As defined in the NIST 
CSF, an organization at the Repeatable or 
Adaptive Framework Tiers understands 
external dependencies, enacts cyber 
supply chain risk management, uses 
risk informed processes, manages 
risk, actively shares with partners, 
and can quickly account for emerging 
cybersecurity supply chain risks.
5. Machine-to-machine security, especially 
legacy systems: Cybersecurity supply 
chain security must address a very large 
diversity of manufactured products, 
machines, operations and configurations, 
and an extensive and heterogeneous base 
of proprietary systems.
Progress in these areas requires additional 
attention on manufacturing cyber supply 
chain security.
 
RECOMMENDATION 5: 
DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK FOR 
MANUFACTURING SUPPLY 
CHAIN CYBERSECURITY.
Similar to existing frameworks on cybersecurity 
and cyber physical security, a comprehensive 
framework should be developed specifically for 
manufacturing supply chain cybersecurity. It 
should reference:
a. robust part validation technologies, 
b. methods to audit attacks and responses, 
c. a common language across 
multiple functional departments and 
organizations, and
d. application of appropriate standards such 
as ISA/IEC 62443 and ISO 27001.
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APPENDIX 1
INITIATIVES BY GOVERNMENT AND 
STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS
In addition to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Cybersecurity and Cyber Physical System Frameworks, several other 
government and nongovernment initiatives are addressing various aspects 
of cybersecurity in manufacturing. Though not an exhaustive list, the most 
relevant to manufacturing include the Department of Defense (DoD), the 
Department of Commerce (DoC), the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the Department of Energy (DoE), the International Standards 
Organization (ISO), and the International Society of Automation (ISA).
One of the most impactful initiatives is the 
DoD’s implementation of cybersecurity Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) (see Box 2). By requiring contractors 
and subcontractors to implement information 
security management controls based on NIST’s 
800-171 documentation, the DFARS have focused 
attention on cybersecurity among many industrial 
companies. Several consultancies are working 
with contractors to meet the December 31, 2017 
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deadline for compliance. NIST’s Manufacturing 
Extension Partnership (MEP) program has also 
started an initiative to assist its client base of 
small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) 
to achieve compliance. However, NIST 800-171 
addresses general cybersecurity practices, not 
industrial control systems. A separate document, 
NIST Special Publication 800-82, “Guide to 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security,” 
addresses supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems 
(DCS), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), and 
other control system configurations. 
The DoD has a Cyber Crime Center (DC3), which 
serves as the operational focal point for the 
defense industrial base cybersecurity program. DC3 
provides digital forensic services, technical training, 
solutions development, and analytics for several 
defense mission areas.51 DC3 includes the Defense 
Industrial Base Collaborative Information Sharing 
Environment (DCISE), the single DoD focal point 
for receiving all cyber incident reporting affecting 
unclassified networks of defense contractors.52 
The Defense Science Board released the report 
of the Cyber Supply Chain Task Force in February 
2017, which addresses many of the issues of 
concern to manufacturing cybersecurity.53 The 
Task Force examined risks to the defense supply 
chain, how to mitigate vulnerabilities, and how to 
manage acquisition to support lifecycle operations 
and minimize risk. The task force recommended 
steps to strengthen lifecycle protection policies, 
enterprise implementation support, and R&D 
programs to ensure that DoD weapons systems 
are designed, fielded, and sustained in a way that 
reduces the likelihood and consequences of cyber 
supply chain attacks.  
At NIST, in addition to the NIST CPS and 
Cybersecurity Frameworks, the “Guide to 
Industrial Control System Security,” the work 
of MEP in cybersecurity, and the cybersecurity 
test bed, the Baldrige Program supports 
cybersecurity. The Baldrige Cybersecurity 
Excellence Builder is a self-assessment tool 
based on the Cybersecurity Framework that is 
intended to help organizations improve their 
cybersecurity risk management efforts.54 
NIST also houses the National Cybersecurity 
Center of Excellence (NCCoE), a hub for 
industry organizations, government agencies, 
and academic institutions to collaborate 
on cybersecurity challenges and develop 
practical solutions. In March 2017, the NCCoE 
released “Capabilities Assessment for Securing 
Manufacturing Industrial Control Systems,” the 
first in a four-part series describing its project in 
ICS security. Each part will address one of four 
cybersecurity capabilities: Behavioral Anomaly 
Detection, ICS Application Whitelisting, Malware 
Detection and Mitigation, and ICS Data Integrity. 
For each capability, the NCCoE will map the 
security characteristics to the Cybersecurity 
Framework and implement each in lab settings 
at NIST. The four-part project will result in a 
Cybersecurity Practice Guide with detailed 
implementation guidelines of practical steps to 
improve cybersecurity.55 
NIST also leads the National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Education (NICE), a partnership between government, 
academia, and the private sector that focuses on 
cybersecurity education, training, and workforce 
development. NICE coordinates public and private 
efforts to build a strong network of cybersecurity 
51 http://www.dc3.mil/.
52 http://www.dc3.mil/cyber-security. 
53 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on  
Cyber Supply Chains, Washington, D.C.: February 2017.
54 https://www.nist.gov/baldrige/products-services/baldrige-cybersecurity-initiative.
55 K. Stouffer and J. McCarthy, “Capabilities Assessment for Securing Manufacturing Industrial Control System,” NIST Engineering   
Laboratory and National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, March 2017.
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BOX 2. DFARS THAT ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY.
DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT
Several DFARS addressing cybersecurity impose a number of requirements on contractors 
and subcontractors for managing data security and include a December 31, 2017 deadline for 
compliance. Table 1 highlights the key requirements in the Cybersecurity DFARS.
SUBPART TITLE REQUIREMENTS
204.73 Safeguarding 
Covered Defense 
Information and 
Cyber Incident 
Reporting
• Contractors and subcontractors must safeguard 
covered defense information that resides in or transits 
through contractor unclassified information system. 
• Incidents involving possible loss of covered data 
must be rapidly reported via dibnet.dod.mil.
252.204-
7012
Safeguarding 
Covered Defense 
Information and 
Cyber Incident 
Reporting
• Contractors will implement information systems 
security protections on all covered Contractor 
unclassified information systems.
• Contractors must implement security requirements 
in NIST 800-171 as soon as practical but not later 
than December 31, 2017.
• For all contracts awarded prior to October 1, 2017, 
the contractor must notify the DoD Chief Information 
Officer, within 30 days of the contract award, of any 
security requirements specified by NIST 800-171 not 
implemented at the time of award.
• Contractors must apply other information system 
security measures whenever additional security 
measures are required.
• If Contractors intend to use cloud services for 
defense information, the cloud service must 
meet security requirements equivalent to those 
established for the Federal Risk and Authorization 
Management Program.
• Incidents must be reported within 72 hours to both 
the prime contractor and the DoD.
• Malicious software discovered and isolated by 
Contractors should be submitted to the DoD Cyber 
Crime Center.
• Contractors must include these requirements in 
subcontracts, and require subcontractors to notify 
the Contractor when requesting variance from NIST 
800-171 and whenever incidents occur.
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education and training programs to increase the 
number and skills of cybersecurity professionals 
across all economic sectors.56 
Another DoC initiative related to manufacturing 
cybersecurity is the National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration’s program to 
increase the security of the Internet of Things 
(IoT). This initiative is a multi-stakeholder process 
to address security vulnerabilities in IoT devices 
through patching and upgrades. The goal of the 
program is to develop common definitions to 
describe security upgradability and to provide 
more transparency in how patches or upgrades 
56 https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied-cybersecurity/nice/about.
57 A. Simpson, “Increasing the Potential of IoT Through Security and Transparency,” at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/increasing- 
potential-iot-through-security-and-transparency.
58 https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2016/multistakeholder-process-iot-security.
59 https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/.
are deployed to IoT devices and applications.57 
Several multi-stakeholder meetings have been 
held and are planned in 2017, and working groups 
formed, to address IoT security.58
The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT) at DHS works across 
all critical infrastructure sectors to reduce risk 
and coordinate responses to control systems-
related cybersecurity incidents.59 Within critical 
infrastructure, DHS has identified four critical 
manufacturing sectors (Box 3), and has established 
a Critical Manufacturing Sector Coordinating Council. 
In 2015, the Council issued the Critical Manufacturing 
BOX 3. CRITICAL MANUFACTURING SECTORS.
1     PRIMARY METALS MANUFACTURING 
•   Iron and steel mills and ferro alloy
•   Alumina and aluminum production and processing
•   Nonferrous metal production and processing
2     MACHINERY MANUFACTURING
•   Engine and turbine manufacturing
•   Power transmission equipment manufacturing
•   Earth moving, mining, agricultural, and construction equipment manufacturing
3     ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, APPLIANCE AND COMPONENT MANUFACTURING
•   Electric motor manufacturing
•   Transformer manufacturing
•   Generator manufacturing
4     TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING
•   Vehicles and commercial ships manufacturing
•   Aerospace products and parts manufacturing
•   Locomotives, railroad and transit cars, and rail track equipment manufacturing
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Sector-Specific Plan, which is designed to guide 
voluntary, collaborative efforts to improve security 
and resilience, including cybersecurity.60 
DoE has a strong program focused on cybersecurity 
for critical energy infrastructure, which often uses 
industrial control systems (ICS) that are similar 
to those used by manufacturers. DoE’s Office of 
Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability has an 
extensive program on cybersecurity for energy 
delivery systems, including both operations and 
R&D programs. The operations program aims to 
use existing technology to increase cybersecurity 
in the energy sector. Initiatives include models 
and system analysis tools to help utilities conduct 
self-assessments and to prioritize investments 
to improve cybersecurity; the Cybersecurity Risk 
Information Sharing Program (CRISP) to enable 
quick communication among utilities on incidents, 
threats, and mitigation measures; and other 
initiatives related to utility operations to help them 
raise cybersecurity as easily as possible. The R&D 
program works through partnerships among 10 
national laboratories, 30 utilities, 30 suppliers, 
and 25 universities to fill gaps in research that will 
provide stronger security with fewer resources. 
A roadmap was released in 2006 and updated in 
2011 to identify research needed to ensure that the 
electric grid can survive and quickly recover from 
cyberattacks. More than 100 research projects 
have been funded since 2010, resulting in more 
than 35 software, firmware, and hardware tools to 
strengthen cybersecurity in the electricity industry.61 
Nongovernmental organizations, particularly 
standards organizations, are also active in 
industrial cybersecurity. For several years, the 
ISA has worked with the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) on security standards 
for industrial automation and control systems. 
This effort created the ISA99 committee, which 
currently includes more than 500 members 
representing organizations and industry sectors 
worldwide. The ISA99 committee works with 
the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) to develop the ISA/IEC 62443 series of 
standards on industrial automation and control 
systems security.62 The series addresses 
product development and component security 
requirements, system-level security technologies, 
policies and procedures, and conformance 
metrics, among other details.
Examples of published standards in the ANSI/ISA 
62443 series include:
 ➤ ANSI/ISA-62443-1-1: Concepts and Models
 ➤ ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1: Requirements for an 
IACS Security Management System
 ➤ ANSI/ISA-62443-3-2: Security Risk 
Assessment and System Design
 ➤ ANSI/ISA-62443-3-3: System Security 
Requirements and Security Levels
 ➤ ANSI/ISA-62443-4-1: Product Development 
Requirements
 ➤ ANSI/ISA-62443-4-2: Technical Security 
Requirements for IACS Components
The ISO also addresses cybersecurity. ISO/
IEC 27001 is a series of information security 
management system standards. Similar in 
concept to ISO 9001 for quality assurance 
and ISO 14001 for environmental protection, 
ISO/IEC 27001:2016 provides best practice 
recommendations on information security 
management, including privacy, confidentiality, 
60 Department of Homeland Security, Critical Manufacturing Sector-Specific Plan, 2015, at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/nipp-ssp- 
critical-manufacturing-2015.
61 Interview with Carol Hawk, Program Manager for Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems.
62 http://isa99.isa.org/ISA99%20Wiki/Home.aspx.
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and cybersecurity. Examples of published 
standards in the ISO/IEC 27001 series include:
 ➤ ISO/IEC 27010: Information security 
management for inter-sector and inter-
organizational communications
 ➤ ISO/IEC 27019: Information security for 
process control in the energy industry
 ➤ ISO/IEC 27032: Guidelines for cybersecurity
 ➤ ISO/IEC 27033: Network security
 ➤ ISO/IEC 27035: Information security incident 
management
Although ISO/IEC 27001 does not specifically target 
manufacturers, the series includes sufficient detail to 
provide the basis for a certification program, similar 
to ISO 9001 quality systems, that could become an 
integral part of the cultural change needed in industry 
to increase focus on cybersecurity.
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APPENDIX 2
GLOSSARY
Blockchain—A blockchain is a distributed 
database used to maintain a continuously growing 
list of records, or blocks. Each block includes a 
timestamp and a link to a previous block. The 
data in any given block cannot be altered without 
altering all subsequent blocks, creating an 
extremely secure, verifiable database. 
Cyberattack—An attack, via cyberspace, 
targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for 
the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or 
maliciously controlling a computing environment/
infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the 
data or stealing controlled information.
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS)—Smart systems 
that include engineered interacting networks 
of physical and computational components. 
Cyber physical systems integrate computation, 
communication, sensing, and actuation with 
physical systems to fulfill time-sensitive functions 
with varying degrees of interaction with the 
environment, including human interaction.
Cybersecurity—The ability to protect or defend the 
use of cyberspace from cyberattacks.
Cyberspace—A global domain within the 
information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information 
systems infrastructures including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, 
and embedded processors and controllers.
Cyber Supply Chain Security—(1) The ability to 
validate the qualifications (properties, structure, 
chain of custody, manufactured conditions) of a 
product or material from a supplier; (2) the ability 
to validate that data about a product qualification; 
(3) the ability to protect or defend the use of 
interconnected cross company cyberspaces from 
cyberattacks that result in loss or corruption of data 
about a product or material, change or corruption of 
data that would alter the expected product output of 
a manufacturing operation and/or taking over any 
actuator control of a physical operation. 
Cyber Supply Chain Security Resilience—The 
ability for a supply chain to continue to operate as 
interconnected cyber space systems while under 
attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, 
and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for 
essential functions after a successful attack. 
Data Integrity—The property that data has not 
been altered in an unauthorized manner. Data 
integrity covers data in storage, during processing, 
and while in transit.
Data Security—Protection of data from 
unauthorized (accidental or intentional) 
modification, destruction, or disclosure.
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) System—A 
system that integrates enterprise-wide 
information including human resources, financials, 
manufacturing, and distribution as well as connects 
the organization to its customers and suppliers. 
Firewall—An inter-network connection device that 
restricts data communication traffic between two 
connected networks. A firewall may be either an 
application installed on a general-purpose computer 
or a dedicated platform (appliance) that forwards 
or rejects/drops packets on a network. Typically, 
firewalls are used to define zone borders. Firewalls 
generally have rules restricting which ports are open.
Information Security—The protection of 
information and information systems from 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Information System—A discrete set of information 
resources organized for the collection, processing, 
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or 
disposition of information.
Information System Resilience—The ability of an 
information system to continue to operate while 
under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated 
state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities 
for essential functions after a successful attack. 
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Information Technology (IT)—Any equipment or 
interconnected system or subsystem of equipment 
that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, 
manipulation, management, movement, control, 
display, switching, interchange, transmission, or 
reception of data or information by the executive 
agency. The term information technology includes 
computers, ancillary equipment, software, 
firmware and similar procedures, services 
(including support services), and related resources.
Industrial Control Systems (ICS)—ICS 
encompasses several types of control systems, 
including supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems 
(DCS), and other control system configurations 
such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) 
often found in the industrial sectors and critical 
infrastructures. An ICS consists of combinations 
of control components (e.g., electrical, mechanical, 
hydraulic, pneumatic) that act together to achieve 
an industrial objective (e.g., manufacturing, 
transportation of matter or energy). 
Machine Controller—A control system/motion 
network that electronically synchronizes drives 
within a machine system instead of relying on 
synchronization via mechanical linkage. 
Malware—Software or firmware intended to 
perform an unauthorized process that will have 
adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of an information system. A virus, worm, 
Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects 
a host. Spyware and some forms of adware are also 
examples of malicious code (malware). 
Manufacturing Execution System (MES)—A 
system that uses network computing to automate 
production control and process automation. By 
downloading recipes and work schedules and 
uploading production results, a MES bridges the 
gap between business and plant-floor or process-
control systems. 
Network—Information system(s) implemented with 
a collection of interconnected components. Such 
components may include routers, hubs, cabling, 
telecommunications controllers, key distribution 
centers, and technical control devices.
Operating System—An integrated collection of 
service routines for supervising the sequencing 
of programs by a computer. An operating 
system may perform the functions of input/
output control, resource scheduling, and data 
management. It provides application programs 
with the fundamental commands for controlling 
the computer. Common operating systems are 
Microsoft Windows, Apple OSX, and Linux.
Operations Technology (OT)—Any physical 
operating equipment at any level of manufacturing 
abstraction that is connected within the 
cyberspace defined by the role of the equipment at 
that level of abstraction. 
Process Controller—A type of computer system, 
typically rack-mounted, that processes sensor 
input, executes control algorithms, and computes 
actuator outputs. 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)—A small 
industrial computer originally designed to perform 
the logic functions executed by electrical hardware 
(relays, switches, and mechanical timer/counters). 
PLCs have evolved into controllers with the 
capability of controlling complex processes, and 
they are used substantially in SCADA systems and 
DCS. PLCs are also used as the primary controller 
in smaller system configurations. PLCs are used 
extensively in almost all industrial processes. 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA)—A generic name for a computerized 
system that gathers and processes data and 
applies operational controls over long distances. 
Typical uses include power transmission and 
distribution and pipeline systems. SCADA 
was designed for the unique communication 
challenges (e.g., delays, data integrity) posed by 
the various media that must be used, such as 
phone lines, microwaves, and satellites. 
Trust Anchor—An authoritative entity represented 
by a public key and associated data. The public 
key is used to verify digital signatures, and the 
associated data are used to constrain the types of 
information or actions for which the trust anchor 
is authoritative.
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